Federalism and Indian Constitution
By Raj Kishore Mishra
The Founding Fathers of the Indian Constitution had no doubt in their minds that a federal structure would be best suited for the governance of the country. In this pursuit, they did study various models but eventually crafted one that they felt would best serve the country’s needs, given its geographical, ethno-linguistic, and religious diversity. This, they articulated in Article 1(1) of the Constitution thus: “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.”
Ironically, barring the period between the first general elections and the tectonic political shift in 1977, when the country had a nearly one-party rule, the political and ideological landscape in the country underwent dramatic changes. With this, dissonance and fault lines in Centre-State relations have emerged. The following paragraphs show how and why.
Governors, appointed by the President of India are expected to ensure that the administration of the States is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Unfortunately, over the years, many of them have opted to do the bidding of the government at the Centre. In spite of judgments by the constitutional courts defining their discretionary powers, some of them have acted in a very partisan manner. Be it recommending President’s Rule under Article 356, showing unholy haste in the swearing-in of a government, or delaying convening of the Assembly for a trial of strength, some Governors have shown obvious bias in favour of the political party ruling at the Centre.
Yet another controversy has arisen recently on their conduct relating to Bills passed by the Legislative Assemblies. Article 200 of the Constitution provides that a Governor may either assent, withhold assent, or reserve a Bill for consideration by the President. S/he can also send the Bill back to the Assembly for reconsideration of parts or the entire Bill. However, if the Assembly repasses the Bill with or without amendments, the Governor is bound to give his assent unless he wishes to send it for Presidential consideration. In a recent case on the conduct of the Governor of Tamil Nadu (in which the Court has reserved its judgment), the apex Court has observed that the Governor cannot sit indefinitely on Bills without any action on his part.
This has been another contentious issue between some Governors in their role as Chancellors of State Universities and the respective State Governments. The Draft Regulations of the UGC (2025) have further exacerbated the matter prompting some State Governments to pass Bills removing the Governor as Chancellor of State Universities.
The current controversy over the NEP (2020) defies logic and raises many questions. That the Policy was the outcome of extensive consultations with all stakeholders cannot be denied. Since ‘education’ comes under the Concurrent List of the Constitution, both the Union and State governments can enact legislation and formulate policies. In the instant case, it’s only a Policy that is recommendatory and not a Central Act that would prevail over any legislation by a State. The Three Language Formula (TLF), the bone of contention between some Southern States led by Tamil Nadu is but one element of this Policy. Surely, an entire Policy cannot be rejected because of just one facet of it. Is it then politics being played out by Tamil Nadu and Kerala because of the elections due next year? Or is Tamil Nadu’s grouse based on the alleged refusal of the Central Government to release funds unless it signed an MoU accepting the Policy, a charge that the latter has denied? The broader issue that arises from these questions is why the parties involved in this raging controversy shouldn’t sit across the table to resolve their differences.
The discordance witnessed in recent days over the yet-to-be-announced delimitation exercise is another instance where a dispassionate dialogue across the table would have helped douse the heat. As per the 84th Amendment of the Constitution, the delimitation exercise as ordained under Article 82 was frozen until the first census after 2026. Notwithstanding the Home Minister’s assurance that no State would lose seats, the Southern States led by Kerala and Tamil Nadu who have stabilized their populations by effective policy interventions fear that they would suffer badly in comparison with their Northern counterparts insofar as representation in Parliament is concerned.
In the celebrated Kesavananda Bharati case, the Supreme Court inter alia declared federalism as one of the basic structures of the Constitution. Now that this is under strain, it is incumbent on all stakeholders to do everything in their power to preserve and strengthen it. Needless to add, consultations and not confrontation should be the key. In this context, one wonders why the National Integration Council hasn’t met since 2013.
(The author is a former Indian Administrative Service (IAS) Officer )
(DISCLAIMER: This is an opinion piece. The views expressed are the author’s own and have nothing to do with OTV’s charter or views. OTV does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same.)